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Adrift on the Sea of
Indeterminacy
MICHAEL H. GOrTESMAN*

I should apologize, right here at the start. I'm out of place in this gathering of
conflicts scholars. I'm not sure why I was invited. I don't "walk the walk," or "talk
the talk." I spent thirty years in the trenches, practicinglaw. My views about choice
of law were shaped, irrevocably, by observing the impact of conflict scholars'
proposals on the real world. It was not a pretty sight.
Today's conflicts scholars no doubt consider themselves a diverse bunch, with
widely differing views about how law should be chosen in multistate disputes. But
from the trenches, most of them look alike.' Each waxes eloquent about the search
for the perfect solution-the most intellectually and morally satisfying choice of law
for each dispute-and each ends the theorizing by embracing some proposition that
will prove wholly indeterminate in practice.
In the Second Restatement, modem-day conflicts scholars buried the hatchet
temporarily, coming together to endorse an approach incorporating all their
conflicting proposals: a cacophonous formula of formulae, a blend of indeterminate
indeterminacy. 2 A total disaster in practice, as all of them now acknowledge?
Now, they're at it again. They propose to clean up their last mess by concocting
another. The mistake last time, they think, was that they compromised with each
other. Now it's time to adopt one single-minded indeterminate formula, and each
proclaims that it should be "mine!"
The prospect of a third restatement fashioned by the architects of the Second (or
their intellectual offspring, the modem-day conflicts scholars), is enough to send
practicing lawyers scurrying for shelter. We are adrift on a sea of indeterminacy, and
we won't find our way to shore in the hands of those whose errant navigation got us
here. Yes, the Second Restatement should be junked. But the new vehicle should be
built by a different crowd. Let judges, lawyers and/or legislators-those who live in
the real world and have to suffer the consequences of the choices made-have a hand
at formulating a new solution, one that would contain determinate choice-of-law
formulae that work in practice.
A decade ago, I sneaked into academia. To vent my unhappiness, born of my
experiences as a lawyer, I fired off what I expected would be my first and last
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. A handful of scholars who advocate bright-line choice of law rules are exempt from the
critique in this paper. See, e.g., LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1995); Douglas
Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and TerritorialStates: The ConstitutionalFoundationsof
Choice ofLaw, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1992).
2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971) [hereinafter SECOND
RESTATEMENT].

3. See Friedrich K. Juenger, A Third Conflicts Restatement?, 75 IND. L.J. 403, 404-05
(2000); William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Prologomenon to an Empirical
Restatement of Conflicts, 75 IND. L.J. 417,419-24 (2000); Symeon C. Symeonides, The Need
for a Third Conflicts Restatement (And a ProposalforTort Conflicts), 75 IND. L.J. 437, 441-46
(2000); Louise Weinberg,A StructuralRevisionofthe Conflicts Restatement,75 IND. L.J. 475,
477 (2000); see also Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for
FederalChoice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 11 & n.42 (1991).
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conflicts article. 4 The article decried, in equal measure, the hash that conflicts had
become and the chefs who had brought this unappetizing dish into being. My
proposal was that Congress enact determinate choice-of-law rules-blunt instruments,
not exquisite philosophizing-and be done with it. A resurrection, if you will, of the
Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws ("FirstRestatement"),5 or perhaps a
gussied-up equivalent that made equally determinate but perhaps more sensible
choices. (Dean Symeonides's core proposal in this Symposium,6 if stripped of its
authorization for courts to "escape," would fill the bill, but so might any number of
other determinate formulae.) My article recognized that an inevitable by-product,
were its proposal adopted, would be rendering conflicts extinct as a field for
scholarship.7 This was a price I was prepared to pay.
Whether because of that article's substantive deficiencies, or its impolitic mocking
of its likeliest audience, it has been one of the least-cited articles in the field. Imagine
my surprise, then, when the invitation came to participate in this Symposium. There
being no other link between me and the field except that article, the invitation
signified two things: (1) somebody had actually read the article (hooray!), and (2) that
reader wanted an encore. Given my documented dyspepsia,the invitation could only
signify a desire that I vent my spleen again. So, having apologized in advance, here
goes.
I. THE

CHARMS OF DETERMINACY

Determinate choice-of-law rules would confer three benefits that are missing in the
present state of chaos.
A. Predictability
At the time they engage in primary activity, parties would like to know what the
law requires of them. When the activity has interstate dimensions, this requires
knowing which state's law will govern their behavior. Determinate choice-of-law
rules, applied uniformly in all states, would provide that certainty. This is no small
accomplishment, and notjust for the actors' peace ofmind. It also serves instrumental
ends. Legal rules are supposed to influence behavior. But if the criteria for choosing
law are so amorphous that parties can't tell which state's law will apply, or if that
choice will vary depending on the plaintiff's post hoc forum selection, then the
defendant-actor cannot know what law to obey.
B. Administrative Efficiency
Parties pay dearly for the administrative chaos that accompanies the present array
of indeterminate choice-of-law criteria. When litigation begins, the parties must bear

4. See Gottesman, supra note 3.
5. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
RESTATEMENT].

6. See Symeonides, supra note 3.
7. See Gottesman, supra note 3, at 50-51.

(1934) [hereinafter

FIRST
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the costs of litigating choice of law. The grab-bag of criteria proffered by section 6
ofthe Second Restatementmakes this litigation battle an intellectually enjoyable one
for the lawyers, but surely not for the clients who must pay their fees. And the costs
do not stop with that initial skirmish. Because choice of law is a question of law, the
party disappointed by the trial court's choice has the opportunity to secure de novo
reconsideration on appeal, and the possibility of reversal is high precisely because the
choice-of-law criteria are so indeterminate. If appellate reversal comes after the case
has been tried, it may render wasted all of the time and expense devoted to litigating
the case below. If, to avoid this, interlocutory appeal of the trial judge's choice-of-law
ruling is sought and obtained, the parties will suffer substantial delay in the resolution
of the suit. The indeterminacy of choice of law also impedes early settlement of
disputes, as the parties cannot confidently estimate the likely outcome of the case.'
C. Uniformity and a Level PlayingField
To achieve the first goal, predictability, the choice-of-law rules must be the same
no matter where the plaintiff files suit. But uniformity-regardless-of-forum-choice
serves another goal as well: even-handed justice. It is simply not fair that one party
gets to choose, after the fact, what legal regime will govern the parties' dispute.
There is more to the law, of course, than predictability, administrative efficiency,
and uniformity. These are the benefits of bright-line rules in any area of the law, but
they have to be weighed against the costs in imperfectjustice. When the latter emerge
as more important, these values may have to yield to multifactored criteria designed
to "get it right." In most areas of the law, scholars recognize that there are trade-offs,
and weigh the competing values before formulating solutions. Conflicts scholarship
is unique in its utter disregard for the values of determinacy.
Of the four main articles in this Symposium, only one mentions predictability as
a relevant consideration, 9 but that one blends it into a "golden medium" in which
courts enjoy the flexibility to "escape" determinate choice-of-law rules when
dissatisfied with the result."° This is akin to the "medium" between swimming on the
surface of the ocean and standing on the ocean floor: it would not be thought
"golden" by those wanting to breathe. Allowing courts an indeterminate "escape"
card vitiates all prospect of predictability.
Administrative convenience is mentioned in none of the major papers. Uniformity
is condemned in the only paper that addresses it (with forum preference for its own
law urged as the superior nostrum).I
Because these values are ignored in the main papers (as they are in most conflicts
scholarship), the authors are spared the burden of demonstrating that their proposals
are worth the price. They proceed as though it were a "given" that the proper office

8. There are public costs as well, such as the judicial time devoted to resolving the
vexatious conundrums of modem choice of lav.
9. See Symeonides, supra note 3.
10. See id.
11. See Weinberg, supranote 3, at 485.
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of the law is to devise the theoretically "best" choice of law, regardless of the
incidental costs inflicted by that quest.'2 In succeeding parts of this Comment, I
suggest that the benefits of the quest do not justify its costs.
II. THE "BENEFITS" OF CHOOSING THE "BEST" LAW
HAVE BEEN GREATLY EXAGGERATED

Conflicts scholars work so hard to find the "best" choice of law because they
assume that something really important turns on the enterprise. That assumption is
unwarranted. Of course, after the fact, choice of law is important to the parties,for
it may be outcome determinative. But somebody is going to win, and somebody lose,
no matter what law is chosen. The right question is whether it is important to society
which state's law is chosen.
The conflicts scholars' unstated but implicit affirmative answer to this question
reflects an unwarranted assumption that the values of choice of law in the
internationalsetting adhere as well in the interstate setting. Conflicts originated as
a field devoted to choosing law when disputes had international implications. 3 In that
context, the stakes can be really important. There are vast cultural differences
between nations, and no mechanism for harmonizing (or keeping within manageable
bounds) the widely divergent legal principles that emerge from those differences. In
some nations, persons are whipped for spray-painting cars; 4 in others, their hands are
chopped off for stealing. 5 These-and their civil law equivalents---often are
shocking to citizens of other lands. Understandably, monitoring the application of
such controversial norms to multinational disputes is deemed important. American
courts would find it intolerable to impose and enforce some foreign norms, and
choice of law is the medium by which they are able to escape doing so.
Conflicts scholars have proceeded as though the stakes are just as high when a
dispute has connections with two or more American states. It's just not so. While
substantive legal rules often differ from state to state, the swing is not so wide as
between nations. The choice between contributory negligence and comparative
negligence does not implicate the fundamental ethos of a nation as does the choice
between imprisonment and cutting off hands. In part, that is because we are a nation
whose fundamental values are shared nationwide. But perhaps more important, it is
because we have an overarching constitution that assures that excesses will be reined
in. Concerns about Nazism, slavery, etc., 6 are irrelevant to choice of law within the
United States. The Constitution will strike down state laws that have toxic
characteristics."'

12. See Juenger, supranote 3; Richman &Reynolds, supranote 3; Symeonides, supranote
3; Weinberg, supranote 3.
13. See BRILMAYER, supra note I, at 12.
14. See Andrea Stone, Whipping PenaltyJudged Too Harsh,USA TODAY, Mar. 10, 1994,
at A3.
15. See MATrHEW LIPPMANETAL., ISLAMIC CRIMINAL LAWAND PROCEDURE 43, 106-10

(1988).

16. See Weinberg, supra note 10, at 492.
17. Professor Weinberg cites the legal treatment of homosexuality as an area in which wide
swings currently exist in America. See id.at 493. But it may well be that the Constitution will
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The Constitution itself recognizes the diminished significance of choice of law in
interstate disputes. The Full Faith and Credit Clause 8 requires the courts of each state
to enforce against its own citizens the judgments of courts of sister states, no matter
how offensive the results to the forum court, and no matter how contrary to the
forum's chosen policies. 9 This is a departure from the traditional rule of international
law-that a nation's courts may withhold enforcement to foreign judgments that
offend the public policy of the forum.2" It reflects constitutional confidence that we
can live with the diversities in our states' laws.
That the interests advanced for indeterminate rules are unimportant is further
evidenced by the wide dichotomy among conflicts scholars as to what is important.
While each identifies something to hang his/her theory upon, in doing so each
implicitly discredits as unimportant the interests that other scholars are trying to
serve.
One group of conflicts scholars thinks that the interests to be served are those of the
states. They think the prize should go to the state with the greatest interest in applying
its own substantive law." But the states themselves seem oblivious to this need that
scholars attribute to them. Can anyone cite a case in which a state appeared as amicus
curiae arguing the importance that its own law be applied? (States often appear as
amicus curiae asserting interests they do hold dear.) Has any state legislature declared
it important that its substantive law be chosen in some defined category of cases
having multistate contacts? My point is not that states are indifferent to having their
own law applied in some cases. Obviously, states have a strong interest in seeing
conduct with injury-causing potential in their borders adjudged by their own
substantive law. But that interest was fully served by Beale's initial choice, in the
FirstRestatement, that the law where the injury was sustained should apply.' That
interest, therefore, does not require an indeterminate choice-of-law rule. Moreover,
while states care about their substantive law, and obviously want it applied in the

strike down all discrimination against gays and lesbians. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986), which declined to do so under the Due Process Clause while leaving open the question
under the Equal Protection Clause, was decided by a 5-4 vote, and one of the Justices in the
majority later publicly recanted. See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN,
CONSTrrtrrIONAL LAW 596 ed. note (13th ed. 1997). More recent decisions of the Court, while
not definitive, reflect an emerging consensus supporting the use of the Constitution and federal
statutory law to ban discrimination based on homosexuality. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S.
624 (1998); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). What is perhaps most telling is that
Professor Weinberg has had to go to the periphery of what is constitutionally permissible to
conjure up a sufficiently troublesome example in order to justify the enterprise.
18. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
19. See Union Nat'l Bank v. Lamb, 337 U.S. 38,41-42 (1940); Roche v. McDonald, 275
U.S. 449, 452, 455 (1928); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908).
20. See BRILMAYER, supra note 1, at 47-68 (describing interest analysis).
21. See HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 713 (4th ed. 1994)
(explaining that comment (g) to section 98 of the Second Restatement "indicates that some
defences not available against sister-state judgments can be interposed to those from foreign
countries," including, inter alia, "that its enforcement would violate public policy" ).
22. See BRILMAYER, supra note 1, at 20-23 (describing the jurisprudential roots of the
FIRST RESTATEMENT).
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general run of cases, there is no evidence that they think it important that their law be
applied in the small subset of cases where choice of law might produce a departure.
Another group of conflicts scholars thinks that the interests to be served are those
of the parties-they are entitled to have the most logical law applied to their
transactions.23 Again, this interest can be served in most instances simply by choosing
sensible determinate rules. Symeonides's presumptive rules would work reasonably
well in this regard if the opportunity for escape were removed.24 To be sure, any set
of determinate rules for choosing law will produce less-than-optimal "fits" with the
parties' sense of logic in some cases, but it is not worth the surrender of certainty and
predictability to secure perfection in these outlying cases. Moreover, in many
contexts the parties can agree in advance on the law that will govern their transaction
if they care enough.
A third group of conflicts scholars acknowledges that the agenda that drives their
approach has nothing to do with conflicts per se, but rather with the underlying
substantive law. This group wants the "better" law chosen in every case.25 These
scholars recognize that each forum is likely to think its own law better, and their
prescriptions give heavy weight to the forum applying its own law.26 They expect that
the "better" law will emerge because the plaintiff will choose the forum with the
better substantive law.
Plaintiffs, of course, are not altruistic. If choice of forum determines choice of law,
they will pick the forum that will yield them a win. So the "better law" crowd has an
agenda: the better law is the law that enables the plaintiff to win. As Professor
Weinberg, a leading exponent of this view, has candidly acknowledged (indeed,
proudly proclaimed), the tort law that enables the plaintiff to win is the better tort law,
and the contract law that enforces the contract is the better contract law. 2 If torts or
contracts scholars articulated such simplistic formulae for fleshing out the substantive
law in their fields, they would be thought to be operating with an incomplete palette.
The proposals do not become more sensible because camouflaged under the banner
"choice of law."29 Happily, they are unlikely to generate a consensus that makes them
operative.

23. See FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 5.
24. See BRILMAYER, supra note I, at 70-73; SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 6
(paying limited deference to this camp by the inclusion of "the protection of justified
expectations" and "certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result" as factors to be
considered along with the conflicting interests championed by other camps in determining
which state's law to apply).
25. See Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEO. L.J. 53 (1991).
26. See Weinberg, supranote 24, at 65-67.
27. See id.
28. See Weinberg, supranote 3, at 485. Professor Juenger exhibits a similar rooting interest
in his article in this Symposium. See Juenger, supra note 3, at 413.
29. What is more, as I have elsewhere shown, there is no reason to assume that the "good
guys" will forever have control over where suits are filed. See Gottesman, supra note 3, at 1415.
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III. THERE Is No BEsTAPPROACH TO CHOOSING LAW

As Professor Juenger recognizes, sixty years of philosophizing about what mix of
criteria will produce the best choice of law have not generated a consensus, or
anything approximating one, among either scholars or courts." Indeed, little new
seems to have emerged from academics in the past several decades, and the field has
stumbled along, the warriors in its competing camps reduced to scholarship that
examines one new judicial decision after another for its faithfulness to the particular
camp's favorite recipe. Small wonder that the bar and the students have stopped
paying attention."
It seems a fair deduction that there is no right answer to the question of what is the
best choice-of-law, but simply a competition of tastes. Indeed, even if one were to
entertain the notion that there is, somewhere, a best solution, it seems clear that we
will never achieve a consensus that recognizes it. It makes no sense to sacrifice the
benefits of determinacy for a will-o'-the-wisp.
IV. THE QUEST FOR THE BESTIMPERILS ACHIEVING
MULTISTATE UNIFORMITY

If one cherishes the hope that all states would adopt the same choice-of-law rules,
so that justice is not determined by the forum choice of the party who gets to court
first, the quest for the best has got to stop. The modem era teaches that quest will
generate different choice of law rules in different states. That is virtually inevitable
if, as I believe, there is no best: it would be a remarkable coincidence if all states
landed on the same solution to a question that has no right answer.
Only a determinate set of choice-of-law rules, which acknowledges its
imperfections and proclaims as its agenda serving the interests of predictability,
administrative efficiency, and uniformity-interests that courts understand and apply
in other contexts-has any hope of attracting the necessary consensus. Some will
respond, no doubt, that the experience of states that have stuck to the First
Restatement refutes this hope. Professor Juenger, for example, notes that West
Virginia, which purports to adhere to the FirstRestatement,has found it irresistible
to depart when the interests of its citizens seem shabbily served.32 But West Virginia
is trapped in a prisoner's dilemma. Most of its sister states are employing one or
another modem device to disadvantage West Virginia citizens appearing in their
courts. It would take heroic patience and altruism to adhere faithfully to determinate

30. See Juenger, supra note 5, at 403-04. I have no quarrel with Professor Juenger's
suggestion that an "interstate" substantive law be developed to resolve multistate disputes,
except that achieving that seems even less likely than achieving consensus on a uniform set of
choice-of-law rules.
31. See Weinberg, supranote 3, at 478 n.16.
32. See Juenger, supranote 3, at 410-I1 & nn. 70, 72 (discussing Mills v. Quality Supplier
Trucking, Inc., 510 S.E.2d 280 (W. Va. 1998), where the court uses forum's comparative
negligence standard because contributory negligence standard of non-forum state would
contravene public policy).
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rules when the other players are not.33 One might reasonably hope that all states
would desist if there emerged a set of determinate rules that corrected for the
"mistakes" that led to the unraveling of the FirstRestatement.
V. IT WILL TAKE A NEW CREW To LEAD US OUT
OF THE SEA OF INDETERMINACY

I am not opposed to the adoption of a third restatement. Or, more accurately, I am
not opposed to the adoption of a third restatement. (The capitals connote entrusting
the enterprise to a body dominated by conflicts scholars, and to that I am opposed.)
Some centralized undertaking is necessary if the current mess is to be cleaned up. I
am on record as favoring a congressional solution, but as yet Congress has remained
idle. Failing that, I would propose entrusting this task to a forum of judges and
lawyers, who would better appreciate the practical implications of the choices made:
something analogous to the judicial conferences that generate federal rules. Yes,
there's usually one academic, entitled the "reporter," who participates in these
conferences. With appropriate care, an academic could be found who would not
subvert the process and cast us all adrift once more.34

33. Professor Brilmayer explains this elegantly. See BRILMAYER, supra note 1,at 181-93.
34. See BRILMAYER, supra note 1; Laycock, supra note 1.

